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Jurisdiction in Admiralty: Pennoyer
v. Neff in Ship's Clothing?
Dennis F. Olsen*
I. Introduction
In the 1978 landmark decision of Shaffer v. Heitner,' the
Supreme Court harmonized American precepts of long-arm jurisdic-
tion and the underlying constitutional standards. The issue in Shaf-
fer was the constitutionality of a Delaware statute that invested that
state's courts with jurisdiction based solely upon the constructive
presence of stock of corporations organized in Delaware.2 Although
nothing in Pennoyer v. Neff was at stake in Shaffer, the Court over-
ruled Pennoyer and Harris v. Balk,4 Pennoyer's quasi in rem descen-
dant.5 Specifically, the Court condemned the kind of quasi in rem
jurisdiction in which the goods attached as a basis for jurisdiction
are absolutely unrelated to the lawsuit and held that all assertions of
jurisdiction should be measured by the general standard of mini-
* Associate Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law.
1. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (1975) provided in part that
(a) If it appears in any complaint filed in the Court of Chancery that the defend-
ant or any one or more of the defendants is a nonresident of the State, the Court may
make an order directing such nonresident defendant or defendants to appear by a
day certain to be designated. Such order shall be served on such nonresident defend-
ant or defendants by mail or otherwise, if practicable, and shall be published in such
manner as the Court directs, not less than once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. The
Court may compel the appearance of the defendant by the seizure of all or any part
of his property, which property may be sold under the order of the Court to pay the
demand of the plaintiff, if the defendant does not appear, or otherwise defaults. Any
defendant whose property shall have been so seized and who shall have entered a
general appearance in the cause may, upon notice to the plaintiff, petition the Court
for an order releasing such property or any part thereof from the seizure. The Court
shall release such property unless the plaintiff shall satisfy the Court that because of
other circumstances there is a reasonable possibility that such release may render it
substantially less likely that plaintiff will obtain satisfaction of any judgment secured.
If such petition shall not be granted, or if no such petition shall be filed, such prop-
erty shall remain subject to seizure and may be sold to satisfy any judgment entered
in the cause. The Court may at any time release such property or any part thereof
upon the giving of sufficient security.
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In this case the Supreme Court held that the state could exercise
jurisdiction over a nonresident to the extent of his property located within the state. Id at 723.
4. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
5. 433 U.S. at 212 n.39.
mum contacts first announced in International Shoe v. Washington. 6
Thus, the Supreme Court invalidated the entire institution of quasi
in rem jurisdiction as an intrinsically adequate basis of jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants.
The federal courts sitting in admiralty, however, have long exer-
cised what is, at least superficially, similar jurisdiction under the spe-
cialized rules for in rem proceedings7 and those making foreign
attachment8 available in aid of in personam proceedings. In regard
to foreign attachment, the practice of establishing jurisdiction solely
upon the presence of a nonresident defendant's assets within a given
forum is specifically authorized by Rule B of the Supplemental
Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims appended to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule provides in part that:
With respect to any admiralty or maritime claim in personam a
verified complaint may contain a prayer for process to attach the
defendant's goods and chattels, or credits and effects in the hands
of garnishees named in the complaint to the amount sued for, if
the defendant shall not be found within the district.9
The divergence between admiralty and maritime rules and the
doctrine of Shaffer was certain to raise legal controversy. Thus, the
validity of in rem and quasi in rem procedures in admiralty actions
must be examined in light of the Shaffer decision. I°
6. Id at 212. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Court
adopted the following standards that assertions of personal jurisdiction must meet to satisfy
due process requirements: First, "[wjhether due process is satisfied must depend ... upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws
which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." Furthermore, these activities
must "establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and
just according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice to permit the
state" to assert its jurisdiction over the matter. Id at 319-20.
7. Rule C(l) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims
permits actions in rem in the following situations: "(a) To enforce any maritime lien; (b) when-
ever a statute of the United States provides for a maritime action in rem or a proceeding
analogous thereto." 28 U.S.C. Supplemental Rule C.
For a description of the maritime lien, see Comment, Due Process in Admiralty Arrest and
Attachment, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1091, 1093-97 (1978).
8. 28 U.S.C. Supplemental Rule B(l).
9. Id Rule B(l). This Rule, which was promulgated as part of the unification of civil
and admiralty procedure, "preserves the traditional maritime remedy of attachment and gar-
nishment, and carries forward the relevant substance of [former] Admiralty Rule 2." 28
U.S.C. Supplemental Rule B, Note of Advisory Committee on Rules, at 532 (1976).
10. As one commentator has noted:
The Shaffer decision concerned only the exercise of state court jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, because of its conclusion that the exercise of in rem jurisdiction is to be
tested under the same constitutional principles as the exercise of in personam juris-
diction, the decision raises issues concerning the in rem jurisdiction of federal courts.
Specifically, the decision may require reconsideration by federal courts of their exer-
cise of the traditional admiralty action in rem and the admiralty attachment proce-
dure.
Bohmann, Applicability ofShaffer to Admiralty In Rem Jurisdiction, 53 TUL. L. REV. 135, 135
(1978) (footnotes omitted).
II. Application of Shaffer v. Heitner to Admiralty Jurisdiction
Inevitably, and rather rapidly, the conflict between Rule B and
the possible effect of Shaffer was tested in the federal courts. I I These
decisions, however, represent strikingly different assumptions about
the applicability and intended reach of Shaffer in the area of admi-
ralty jurisdiction.
In Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian Transport Agen-
cies, Ltd, 12 the federal district court upheld Rule B as a permissible
use of quasi in rem jurisdiction, reasoning that the constitutional
pedigree of foreign attachment was sufficiently independent of limi-
tations that might otherwise apply to state court jurisdiction to war-
rant different due process treatment. 13  With impressive
discontinuity, the court then ruled that even if Rule B was immu-
nized from constitutional scrutiny as a jurisdictional base, it must
nevertheless stand the full test of due process as a mode of prejudg-
ment attachment. Thus, it was unconstitutional 4 under the doctrine
of Sniadach v. Family Finance'5 and its progeny,' 6 which generally
stand for the proposition that prejudgment attachment, garnishment,
sequestration or similar practices must be preceded by adequate no-
tice and opportunity to be heard. The court, however, failed to ex-
plain why the full force of due process impinges upon Rule B as a
prejudgment remedy but leaves it unaffected as a basis of jurisdic-
tion despite the ridiculousness of that jurisdictional assertion when
measured by minimum contact analysis.
Taking a different approach, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York in Engineering Equipment Co.
v. S.S. Selene, 7 held that quasi in rem attachment of a debt present
within the jurisdiction was permissible under Rule B provided the
plaintiffs could show that the underlying cause of action was, a la
Shaffer v. Heitner, adequately related to the forum. 18 These seem-
ingly contrary applications of Shaffer to the realm of admiralty rep-
resent drastically different assumptions concerning the relationship
of federal maritime jurisdiction to state jurisdiction and neither ap-
proach is especially workable as a future tool of admiralty jurisdic-
tion.
11. Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447
(W.D. Wash. 1978); Engineering Equip. Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
12. 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
13. Id at 453-55.
14. Id at 456-59.
15. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
16. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
17. 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
18. Id at 709.
A. Grand Bahama Petroleum
1. Aaritime Attachment may Provide Basis for Jurisdiction.-
Grand Bahama Petroleum concerned quasi in rem attachment in an
extreme situation. A foreign oil supplier filed suit against the Cana-
dian charterers of a Soviet flag vessel and jurisdiction was based
upon the attachment of the charterers' Washington bank account,
pursuant to Rule B(l). The in-state bank account was owned by Pa-
cific Seatrains Company, a Canadian subsidiary of Canadian Trans-
port Agencies. At that level, all relationship with or connection to
the State of Washington and the asserted lawsuit ends.' 9
The actual cause of action was for breach of a contract to supply
engine oil to a chartered Soviet vessel, the Kuibshevges, at Freeport,
Grand Bahama Island in the Caribbean. The Kuibshevges called at
Freeport to take on bunkers and, while there, ordered 330 tons of
fuel oil from the plaintiff. The fuel was supplied, but the required
simultaneous payment deposit of $45,000 was never made; the Kuib-
shevges put to sea with the unpaid oil. The opinion neither states
nor implies whether the Kuibshevges was traveling from one Ameri-
can port to another, or, more particularly, whether the vessel was
headed for the state of Washington. Moreover, Grand Bahama Pe-
troleum Company appears to have no connection with the State of
Washington; it is a Bahamian corporation whose business activities
appear confined to that island.
20
It is difficult, therefore, to imagine a more extreme application
of quasi in rem attachment: a foreign oil company doing no business
in the forum institutes suit against another foreign corporate mari-
time charterer, also not conducting business activities within the fo-
rum, for unpaid supplies furnished in a distant foreign port to a
vessel registered in yet a third nation. The court in Grand Bahama
seems to concede the extremity of the situation. The court stated,
"Finally, the only contact which the defendants in this case appear to
have with this district is the existence of a bank account in a local
Seattle bank. This may be more substantial than the contacts the
Shaffer defendants had with Delaware, but it is a limited contact
nonetheless."
2'
In defending Rule B against the Shaffer challenge raised by the
Canadian defendants, the court began with the premise that actions
against property are "the keystone of admiralty jurisprudence, ' 22 the
implication being that the libeling of vessels and attachment of
goods, common in federal maritime cases, cannot be lightly turned
19. 450 F. Supp. at 449.
20. Id
21. Id at 452.
22. Id at 452-53.
aside. The court's articulated reasons for sustaining Rule B are
largely historical, based principally on the case of Manro v. Al-
meida.23 The issue in Manro was not the constitutionality of ex-
treme assertions of quasi in rem jurisdiction, but rather whether
foreign attachment was a permissible remedy in admiralty. The
Supreme Court noted that foreign attachment was a long recognized
admiralty remedy in civil law and was recognized in the early Judi-
cature and Process Acts at the time of the initial organization of the
American federal courts. The opinion in Manro concluded that
maritime attachment was a recognized remedy at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution and, therefore, a permissible tool for
relief in a case filed in admiralty.24
Subsequent to Manro, rules authorizing the use of foreign at-
tachment were promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to con-
gressional mandate. These Supreme Court rules eventuated in the
enactment of Rule B when the rules of civil and admiralty procedure
were unified in 1966. On the basis of this analysis, the district court
concluded that "maritime attachment is constitutionally permissible.
The recognized autonomy of admiralty jurisprudence, although not
absolute, and the long constitutional viability of maritime attach-
ment compel me to conclude that Shaffer does not reach Rule B(l)
attachment."25
In reaching this conclusion, the court ignores the troubling
proposition that neither Manro, the nineteenth century Supreme
Court Rules of Foreign Attachment, nor Rule B itself address the
23. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473 (1825).
24. Various and conflicting views exist in regard to the origins of American admiralty
law. The Manro Court chose to address itself to only one of these views and to gloss over areas
of historical ambiguity. Subsequent opinions have apparently followed Manro without ques-
tioning the substance of this choice. See, e.g., Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian
Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
In Aanro, Justice Johnson presented the view that our admiralty law was adopted directly
from the English admiralty law without the prohibitions placed on the English Admiralty
Court by the English Courts of Common Law. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 489. In giving meaning
to the words "admiralty" and "maritime" as found in the Maritime Lien Act and Rule B,
however, it would be grave error to look solely to English law. Merely because our country
was once a collection of English colonies and shared essentially the same language, it does not
follow that our concepts of admiralty and maritime law are identical or even similar to English
concepts. BENEDICT, THE AMERICAN ADMIRALTY (4th ed. 1910).
At the time of the 1792 Act, this country was comprised of people of numerous nationali-
ties, e.g., French, English, Scots, Irish--each nationality having a different history and often
radically different approaches to admiralty law. This country had been comprised of thirteen
independent and sovereign states--each having its own approach to admiralty law. Neither
the United States Constitution nor the Act indicate which history and approach were intended
to be incorporated in the words "admiralty" and "maritime." Legislative history is also murky
on this point. Therefore, Justice Johnson's choice of the English history and approach in
Manro seem rather arbitrary. Indeed, the Court acknowledged: "ITihe practice of issuing
attachments had been discontinued in the English Courts of admiralty, while in some of our
own Courts it was still in use, perhaps not so generally as to sanction our sustaining it altogether
on authority... " 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 490 (emphasis added).
25. 450 F. Supp. at 455.
due process problem. These historical sources merely establish that
foreign attachment was, and apparently still is, a permissible remedy
in admiralty. For example, Rule 2 of the Supreme Court's Special
Rules (cited by the court) provided as follows:
In suits in personam, the mesne process may be by a simple war-
rant of arrest of the person of the defendant, in the nature of a
capias, or by a warrant of arrest of the person of the defendant,
with a clause therein, that if he cannot be found, to attach his
goods and chattels to the amount sued for; or if such property
cannot be found, to attach his credits and effects to the amount
sued for in the hands of the garnishees named therein; or by a
simple monition, in the nature of a summons to appear and an-
swer to the suit, as the libellant shall, in his libel or information,
pray for or elect.
26
Rule 2 thus provided several different means of jurisdictionally
initiating a lawsuit, including the physical arrest of the defendant by
writ of capias ad respondendum.21 Capias ad respondendum, how-
ever, was long ago recognized as an unfair, unjust, and outdated
means of establishing jurisdiction.28 Likewise, the allowance of for-
eign attachments by Rule B is constitutionally questionable under
contemporary due process standards. 29 The inclusion of these de-
vices in nineteenth century specifications of admiralty remedies sig-
nifies nothing about their present, constitutional viability.
Nevertheless, the Grand Bahama court concluded that since foreign
attachment has always been a remedy included within admiralty, 30 it
is constitutional.
The court buttressed its historical analysis with the observation
that "on purely analytical grounds" Rule B should also stand.3' It
determined that the general trend in admiralty jurisprudence has
been to strengthen traditional admiralty remedies against property.32
Although this notion may have support, the assertion surely ignores
other, perhaps more pervasive trends, in admiralty jurisprudence.
For example in, Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-&5, 33 the
26. Rule 2, Admiralty Rules of 1844, reprinted in 7A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE .30
at 224 (1977).
27. Capias ad respondendum was a common-law procedure used to initiate a lawsuit by
incarcerating the defendant pending determination of the civil suit on the merits.
28. International Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
29. Of course, Rule B no longer includes the capias procedure as a means of attaining
jurisdiction.
30. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
31. 450 F. Supp. at 456.
32. For example, in 1971 Congress amended the Maritime Lien Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 973
(1975). Although the amendment made no change in maritime lien law or priority of maritime
liens, the effect of the change was "to negate the operation of a 'no lien provision' in a charter
to which the American materialism [sic] was not a party and of which he has no knowledge so
that he will not be precluded from acquiring a lien for his service to which he would otherwise
be entitled." H.R. REP. No. 92-340, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONrG.
& AD. NEWS 1363, 1365. Thus, American materialmen have increased ability to collect
"amounts owed on necessaries furnished a vessel." Id
33. 364 U.S. 19 (1960).
Supreme Court generally indicated that in rem and quasi in rem
remedies in admiralty should be subject to all or nearly all the statu-
tory and constitutional strictures that otherwise define matters of
venue, transfer, and jurisdiction in the federal courts.34
2. Rule B Attachments Violate Due Process Requirements.-
With jurisdiction in admiralty safely established, the Grand Bahama
court considered the second constitutional assertion raised by the
Canadian charterers. They argued that even if Rule B was permissi-
ble as a jurisdictional predicate, the prejudgment garnishment of the
assets in the Seattle bank account without reasonable notice and op-
portunity to be heard violated the procedural due process standards
of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation35 and subsequent cases.
36
These cases require that a defendant be given an opportunity to con-
test the merits under which property is seized prior to the time of
seizure.
The district court recognized that North Georgia Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem37 was almost on point. Both cases involved procedural
rights in a commercial setting in which a corporate plaintiff gar-
nished the bank account of a corporate defendant.38 In North Geor-
gia Finishing the Supreme Court invalidated the Georgia
garnishment statute that authorized prejudgment attachment of as-
sets upon the basis of a conclusory affidavit filed by the plaintiff or
plaintiff's attorney and the consequent issuance of an attachment
writ by the court clerk.39 Since the garnishment procedures specified
in Rule B are nearly identical to the Georgia statute, the oil supplier
needed to justify reaching a different result in support of Rule B.
Thus, it argued exactly what the court had decided in the jurisdiction
issue: Rule B was an admiralty device not subject to exacting consti-
tutional scrutiny. Correlatively, the oil supplier urged that the use of
prejudgment garnishment as a means of obtaining jurisdiction, an
attachment purpose not involved in any of the earlier decisions,' °
was constitutionally permissible.4"
The Supreme Court had held in Ownbey v. Morgan42 that the
use of prejudgment attachment to invest a court with jurisdiction
was a sufficiently important public purpose to excuse procedural de-
ficiencies that might otherwise invalidate the attachment if alternate
34. See notes 87-91 and accompanying text infra.
35. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
36. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
37. 419 U.S. at 601 (1975).
38. 450 F. Supp. at 456.
39. 419 U.S. at 601.
40. See note 16 supra.
41. 450 F. Supp. at 457.
42. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
means of obtaining jurisdiction were available. The Court noted the
continued vitality of this proposition in Fuentes v. Shevin.43 Since
property seizure as a jurisdictional base was proscribed in Shaffer v.
Heitner, however, the Grand Bahama court reasoned that Ownbey
was probably no longer good law." Thus, the court announced that
"an admiralty action is insufficient to justify the procedure employed
to seize defendants' bank account pursuant to Rule B(l)."'4 The
court also found "no indication that maritime defendants may be
constitutionally due less procedural protection against the mistaken
deprivation of property than non-maritime defendants."46
Therefore, Grand Bahama can be reduced to the alarming prop-
osition that Shaffer v. Heitner has no effect on the reasonableness of
maritime quasi in rem attachment but must nevertheless be applied
to measure the constitutionality of such attachment as a prejudgment
remedy. By hypothesis then, Grand Bahama is internally inconsis-
tent: Rule B is valid as a jurisdictional predicate but impermissible
as a prejudgment remedy. It would be permissible as a prejudgment
remedy only if it was accompanied by prior in personam service of
process upon the defendant, in which case it is no longer needed as a
jurisdictional predicate.47
B. Engineering Equipment Co. v. S, S Selene
In S.S. Selene,4 the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York was similarly presented the problem of
reconciling Rule B attachments and the new restraints of Shaffer v.
Heitner. The defendants in SS Selene were two foreign corpora-
tions whose vessel was operated in coastal shipping in the eastern
United States and other defendants in charge of actual operation of
the vessel who issued the bills of lading to the charter parties. These
charterers were served personally within the district and made no
objection to the in personam jurisdiction thus established. The ac-
tual claim in the controversy was for damage and misdelivery to
cargo shipped in the SS Selene. Jurisdiction over the foreign cor-
porations, however, was based upon the attachment by plaintiff of
obligations of the codefendant charterer to pay charter hire to these
foreign corporations. The codefendants were thus the garnishees of
the foreign corporations not susceptible to the direct jurisdiction of
43. 407 U.S. 67, 91 n.23 (1972). For a discussion of Ownbey v. Morgan in light of the
Sniadach and Fuentes decisions, see Morse, The Conflict Between the Supreme Court Admiralty
Rules and Sniadach-Fuentes: A Collision Course?, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 10-16 (1975).
44. 450 F. Supp. at 457.
45. Id at 459.
46. Id
47. See notes 92-98 and accompanying text infra.
48. 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
the court.49
Applying classic notions of quasi in rem jurisdiction, the court
reasoned that since the codefendants were subject to the in personam
jurisdiction of the court, the debt owed by them to the foreign corpo-
rations was similarly "within" the district. Therefore, it was suscep-
tible to attachment within the district under Rule B since it was
"present" and the foreign corporations were, as Rule B requires, ab-
sent from the jurisdiction.5 °
The vessel owners argued that Rule B, as applied in this context,
was unconstitutional under Shaffer v. Heitner, reasoning that the as-
sertion of jurisdiction over the foreign defendants was permissible
under Shaffer only in the presence of attendant, underlying mini-
mum contacts.5 In contrast to the frontal assault lodged on Rule B,
by the Grand Bahama defendants, the implicit assumption of the S.S.
Selene defendants was that Rule B is not textually unconstitutional,
but is potentially unconstitutional if applied in situations in which
there is no underlying relationship between the forum and the cause
of action.
The court agreed that Shaffer applied but disagreed on the
existence of underlying minimum contacts. The court recognized
that since the assertion of jurisdiction was exclusively federal under
Rule B, the Rule must be tested "under the standards of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment, not those of the Fourteenth
Amendment."52 Thus, the "forum" with which the vessel owners
must have substantial relations was the United States as a whole
rather than the forum state, New York. On this basis, the court
found sufficient minimum contacts: the defendant's vessel had trans-
acted business in Philadelphia by putting into port there; the charter
parties under which the goods in question were shipped were negoti-
ated and concluded in the United States; the debt attached was pres-
ent in the district in which the suit was instituted; and finally, the
foreign defendants themselves had invoked the forum court's juris-
diction by suing for the past due charter hire. On the basis of these
factors, the court concluded that minimum contacts with the United
States existed and Rule B had, at least in this case, met the strictures
of Shaffer.53
49. Id at 708.
50. Id at 708-09, as the court noted, "Under Rule B(l), the situs of a debt is determined
according to federal law. As a matter of federal law, however, we defer to the law of the forum
state on this question. Del Bergenske Dampskibsselskab v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 341 F.2d 50,
52 (2d Cir. 1965)." Id at 709 n.5.
51. Id at 709.
52. Id Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that "the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes no more stringent requirements upon state officials than does the Fifth
upon their federal counterparts." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 702 n.3 (1976).
53. Id at 709-10.
This case illustrates a drastically different operating assumption
in applying Shaffer than that of the court in Grand Bahama. The
New York court makes no attempt to insulate Rule B as a peculiar
maritime device not susceptible to constitutional scrutiny. Faced
with the facts of the Grand Bahama litigation, the New York district
court would probably have determined that the attachment of the
Seattle bank account of the Canadian defendants was constitution-
ally inappropriate since manifestly no relationship of the cause of
action to the forum existed. The district court in Seattle, however,
would probably have found the underlying Shaffer relationship that
did exist in the S.S. Selene litigation to be irrelevant. The debt was
appropriately within the forum as required by Rule B, and as a
unique federal device in admiralty, Rule B is not susceptible to eval-
uation under Shaffer. Therefore, the attachment of the charter hire
debts was alone sufficient to predicate jurisdiction.54
III A Look at Shaffer
If the issue in these two cases is the measurable reach of Shaffer
in admiralty, neither decision examined the actual Shaffer decision
very closely for a possible answer to that question. Grand Bahama
relies on Manro while S.S. Selene assumes that token nationwide
minimum contacts satisfies the Shaffer equation. Neither approach
is very consistent with either the general thrust of Shaffer or its spe-
cific mandates.
The main purpose of Shaffer was to eliminate from American
jurisdictional traditions the notion that a claim could be asserted
"against" property.
The case for applying to jurisdiction in rem the same test of
"fair play and substantial justice" as governs assertions of jurisdic-
tion in personam is simple and straightforward. It is premised on
recognition that "[tihe phrase, 'judicial jurisdiction over a thing,'
is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the
interests of persons in a thing." Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws § 56, Introductory Note (1971) .... This recognition
leads to the conclusion that in order to justify an exercise of juris-
diction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to jus-
tify exercising "jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a
thing." The standard for determining whether an exercise ofjuris-
diction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due
Process Clause is the minimum contacts standard elucidated in
54. A case of interest is Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de
Navigation, 459 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 605 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1979), in which
Judge Tenney of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
adopted the Grand Bahama interpretation of the Shaffer decision. The court, aware that the
"repercussions of Shaffer are ... yet to be assessed dispositively," traced the analysis in the
Grand Bahama case. Id at 1248. Judge Tenney found this argument persuasive and con-
cluded that "Shaffer does not destroy the venerable tradition of maritime action commenced
quasi in rem." Id. at 1249.
International Shoe. 55
Property is, in a word, inanimate. "It" could care less who
owns, conveys, leases, libels, or attaches their legal interest in it. The
business of jurisdiction, however, is animate. It concerns the mea-
suring and balancing in constitutional terms, of the relative conven-
ience to the parties involved in a controversy of trying a law suit one
place as opposed to another. To the extent that the presence of cer-
tain property in a forum fits into this determination, it is relevant;
otherwise, Shaffer seems to say, it is not.
The Court presumed that the most common instances of in rem
jurisdiction would necessarily fall within the category in which the
presence of the "res" said something about the relative convenience
of the parties.56 Thus, many actions that were traditionally brought
in rem are not affected by the Shaffer decision.
The absence of any indication by the Shaffer court concerning
the use of libel in rem, however, leaves lower courts faced with ques-
tions of admiralty jurisdiction without guidance.57 Many would
blandly argue that the institution is utterly beyond reproach.58 The
55. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977)(footnote omitted).
56. [Tihe presence of property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction by
providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation. For
example, when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying contro-
versy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State
where the property is located not to have jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendant's
claim to property located in the State would normally indicate that he expected to
benefit from the State's protection of his interest. The State's strong interests in as-
suring the marketability of property within its borders and in providing a procedure
for peaceful resolution of disputes about possession of that property would also sup-
port jurisdiction, as would the likelihood that important records and witnesses will be
found in the State. The presence of property may also favor jurisdiction in cases such
as suits for injury suffered on the land of an absentee owner, where the defendant's
ownership of the property is conceded but the cause of action is otherwise related to
rights and duties growing out of that ownership.
Id at 207-08 (footnotes omitted).
57. One possible explanation for this failure is that the extension of the International
Shoe standards by the Court was intended merely for "assertions of state-court jurisdiction."
Id at 212.
In Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d
648 (2d Cir. 1979), the court observed that,
Shaffer did not consider assertion of jurisdiction over property in the admiralty con-
text. Because the perpetrators of maritime injury are likely to be peripatetic, Ex
Parte Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488, 493, 10 S. Ct. 587, 33 L. Ed. 991 (1890),
and since the constitutional power of the federal courts is separately derived in admi-
ralty, U.S. Constitution Art. III § 2, suits under admiralty jurisdiction involve sepa-
rate policies to some extent. This tradition suggests not only that jurisdiction by
attachment of property should be accorded special deference in the admiralty con-
text, but also that maritime actors must reasonably expect to be sued where their
property may be found.
Id at 655 (footnote omitted).
58. One commentator has concluded that,
Where the identity of the responsible party is unknown to the party wronged, or
where the responsible party is known to reside overseas, the maritime remedies of
arrest in rem or attachment inpersonam are indispensable means of redress in United
States courts. Where the responsible party is personally accountable in some United
States jurisdiction, these maritime remedies give the party wronged a wider choice of
forum and greater security for his claim than under the common law.
pre-Shaffer opinion in Techem Chemical Co. P. M/T Choyo Maru59
is an example. In dicta, the court cast aside any argument question-
ing maritime attachment or in rem seizure, principally because they
have been countenanced by "a series of statutes, running back to the
late 1700's . . ,6.o Thus, the long pedigree seems to foreclose con-
temporary inquiry. The problem now, however, is that contempo-
rary constitutional standards seem to dictate just such an inquiry,
despite how impolite the traditionalists may think it to be. The his-
torical pedigree of admiralty jurisdiction is, in this respect, of no im-
portance, and one cannot doubt that analysis of the in rem libel
under the Shaffer standard is, therefore, imminent.
When the examination does occur, considerable tradition will
actually support the notion that an in rem libel, like any other asser-
tion of jurisdiction, must now be consistent with the principle of
minimum contacts. In United States v. Freights of Mount Shasta,
6 1
Justice Holmes observed that a ship is a "res" not because it is tangi-
ble but because "it is a focus of rights that in like manner may be
dealt with by the law. It is no more a res than a copyright. Howfar
infact the admiralty has carried its proceeding in rem is a question of
tradition. "62
In Mount Shasta, the Court held that an obligation for money
due under a contract of carriage could serve as an appropriate basis
for in rem jurisdiction, provided that it constituted the "focus of
rights." 63 This is the same notion found in Shaffer. The vessel (or
any other res) is the appropriate "focus" of controversy when it is
substantially related to both the controversy and the forum in which
the litigation is to proceed.64 Indeed, these situations have been rela-
tively common in admiralty.6 5 The predominant American ap-
proach has been to "personify" the ship and thereby pretend, to the
greatest extent possible, that it is the offending thing.66 Once having
offended, the vessel can thus be sued in whosoever hands it may fall,
to the chagrin of present, unknowing owners but the delight of credi-
tors.
McCreary, Goingfor the Jugular Vein." Arrests and Attachments in Admiralty, 28 OHIO ST. L.
19, 44 (1967).
59. 416 F. Supp. 960 (D. Md. 1976).
60. Id at 967.
61. 274 U.S. 466 (1927).
62. Id at 470 (emphasis added).
63. Id at 470-71. See generally G. ROBINSON, ROBINSON ON ADMIRALTY LAW 357-62
(1939).
64. See note 56 supra.
65. See, e.g., Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co., 237 U.S. 303 (1915); Ameri-
can Bank of Wage Claims v. Registry of the Dist. Court of Guam, 431 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir.
1970).
66. The more common, contrary view is observed in England: the in rem libel is only a
security device to secure the appearance of the ship's owner. See I Price, The Law of Maritime
Liens -, (1940).
A classic formulation of the problem was presented in The Bold
Bucclengh,67  an English case decided in 1852 using American
precepts of vessel personification. In rem jurisdiction was sustained
to enforce a claim for collision damage incurred prior to and without
the knowledge of the present owner. A maritime lien, the inevitable
maritime remedy that flows from in rem jurisdiction, 68 was im-
pressed against the vessel.
The imposition of an indelible liability against the present own-
er's legal interests might be justified by the peculiarities of the mari-
time lien and thus distinguishable from the antecedent issue of
jurisdiction. It seems plainly untenable in modem terms, however,
to hold that the vessel could appropriately serve as "the focus of
rights" of the previous, collision-responsible owner who has con-
veyed the vessel for value to an unknowing good faith purchaser.69
The China7° represents a domestic example of in rem personifi-
cation of a sea-going res that, in reality, lacks any connection to the
asserted lawsuit. In that case, the issue Was not the imposition of in
rem jurisdiction to adjudicate a previous owner's liability but in rem
jurisdiction to impose liability against a ship for which no one with
any ownership interest in the vessel was responsible. Since early in
the nineteenth century, major harbors have strictly required that
state or city-employed pilots, the familiar harbor pilot, take com-
mand of vessels entering the harbor in order to safely conduct the
67. [1852] 7 Moore, P.C. 267. Although the case is dated, it continues to be cited as
orthodoxy. See, e.g., G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 595 (2d ed. 1975).
68. A maritime lien does not include or require possession. The word is used in
maritime law not in the strict legal sense in which we understand it in Courts of
Common Law, in which case there could be no lien where there was no possession,
actual or constructive; but to express, as if by analogy, the nature of claims which
neither presuppose nor originate in possession. This was well understood in the Civil
Law, by which there might be a pledge with possession, and a hypothecation without
possession, and by which in either case the right traveled with the thing into whoseso-
ever possession it came. . . . This claim or privilege. . . travels with the thing into
whosesoever possession it may come. It is inchoate from the moment the claim or
privilege attaches, and when carried into effect by legal process, by a proceeding in
rem, relates back to the period when it first attached ....
This rule, which is simple and intelligible, is in our opinion applicable to all
cases. It is not necessary to say that the lien is indelible and may not be lost by
negligence or delay where the rights of third parties may be compromised; but where
reasonable diligence is used, and the proceedings are had in good faith, the lien may
be enforced, into whosesoever possession the thing may come.
[1852] 7 Moore, P.C. at 284-85, cited in G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 67, at 595.
This notion of "hypothecation" is in interesting, stark contrast to Shaffer's less metaphysi-
cal theory of the relationship between litigants and their property: "The fiction that an asser-
tion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion ofjurisdiction over the owner of
the property supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification. Its continued
acceptance would serve only to allow state court-jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to
the defendant." 433 U.S. at 212.
69. The original owner of the Bold Buccleugh was not amenable to jurisdiction in En-
gland.
70. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1869).
vessel to berth-side.7' The China, a foreign vessel, collided with an
American ship solely by reason of the compulsory pilot's negligence
and gross mismanagement. As a result of the collision, the American
vessel sank.72 Since the pilot was effectively judgment proof because
of the amount of the damage, the owners of the sunken vessel had
only a single recourse, in rem libel of the "wrong-doing" vessel.7 3
The Supreme Court focused on the maritime lien, which sub-
stantive admiralty law imposed for collision when a vessel is solely at
fault. Reasoning backwards, the Court concluded that jurisdiction
in rem must exist to support the lien that inevitably results.7 4 It is
difficult to determine how The China could serve as "the focus" of
anyone's rights involved in the substantive controversy. The harbor
pilot had no interest in the vessel upon which to focus. Although the
owner's interests were surely at stake, they were manifestly uncon-
nected with the substantive, collision controversy.75
In contemporary terms, conceiving constitutionally sufficient
justification for The China under the theory of in rem jurisdiction
postulated in Mount Shasta and seemingly required by Shaffer is
difficult. Concededly, the vessel was libeled in New York where the
collision occurred. Furthermore, New York has a substantial inter-
est in regulating harbor safety and providing a forum for recovery.
In addition, the tort occurred in New York. These factors amount to
an impressive list of minimum contacts. These contacts are, how-
ever, insignificant since the owners of the vessel, past or present, were
not responsible for the collision. The vessel was empressed, in rem,
to account for a third party's wrongdoing.
The main justification for the rule in The China is substantive:
a limited species of strict liability for the wrongs of others is indis-
pensable in certain maritime contexts like harbor pilotage.7 6 Al-
though the fiction of a personified vessel is admittedly not "much
more than a literary theme, '7 7 its results are unequivocally sup-
ported.78
71. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 103, § 25 (West 1972) (historical note); Act of
March 29, 1803, P.L. 542, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 55, §§ 171-177 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
72. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 58.
73. Id at 61.
74. Id at 68-69.
75. The court carefully established that the pilotage statute was mandatory, id at 59-61,
and no degree of fault, implicit or otherwise, could be substantially imposed on the owner. Id
at 61-66.
76. See note 58 supra. See also Note, Personcation of Vessels, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1122
(1964).
77. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 67, at 616.
78. [Gliven a breach of duty by the third party in control, the shipowner's limited (in
rem) liability follows as a matter of course, whether or not the third party (e.g., an
employer subject to a Workmen's Compensation Act) is entitled to a limitation of his
own liability vis-A-vis his victims. That approach, it is submitted, is (as far as it goes)
entirely sound and does not, for its justification, depend. . . on the personification of
the "offending vessel." Abandonment of the agreeable fiction of ship's personality
For example, in Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Service of Texas,
Inc., 79 the court considered whether in rem libel was permitted when
ship repairers caused the vessel to become unseaworthy, causing in-
jury to a stevedore on the vessel. Despite the lack of fault or negli-
gence on the part of the owner, the court of appeals sustained the in
rem jurisdiction over the vessel, reasoning that,
Obviously . . . the absence of possession and control may well
insulate the shipowner from a liability in personam in the absence
of conduct which somehow implicates the remote owner in the
deficiency. But on principles of in rem liability, or concepts akin
to it, there seems to be no more reason for the physical absence of
an owner's representative universally to insulate the vessel from
accountability for personal injuries occasioned by unseaworthi-
ness than there is to absolve the vessel from in rem liability for,
say, other types of maritime torts including collision, even though
the vessel, on this hypothesis, is wholly in the control of a demise
charterer and, worse, being conned by a compulsory pilot.
80
Thus, it appears that the principles of substantive "in rem liabil-
ity" are different from "in personam" principles that would apply if
the owner were sued directly. Courts base the doctrine of unseawor-
thiness on the notion of liability more or less without fault,8 ' and,
therefore, holding the owners liable under these circumstances is not
surprising. Certainly, vessel owners" have been held liable in far
more attenuated circumstances. 82 To establish a rule of liability in
rem when the owner is not equivalently liable in personam is, with
all due respect, inexplicably absurd. If this was not evident before
Shaffer, it seems unavoidable after that decision.
Applying the Grigsby theory in a nonmaritime context, one
would argue that quasi in rem attachment was justified because it
was somehow based on different substantive principles. For exam-
ple, in Shaffer itself, plaintiffs would argue that the nonresident
board of directors, sued by attachment of the stock constructively
located in Delaware, were liable in that state for certain corporate
conduct for which they would not be responsible in personam. One
can only note that if this had been the asserted justification for the
will have been bought at far too high a price if twentieth century shipowners are to be
absolved of liability for the tortious uses to which their ships are put by third parties
to whom they have entrusted control. But an attentive study of Judge Hand's Grillea
opinion and Judge Brown's Grigsby opinion should make clear that there is no rea-
son why such a price need be paid.
Id at 621-22.
79. 412 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1969).
80. Id at 1030-31 (footnotes omitted). See also Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919
(2d Cir. 1956).
81. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
82. See Webb v. Dresser Indus., 536 F.2d 603, rehearing denied, 540 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir.
1976). This case provides an interesting example. The claimant slipped on icy pavement in
Seward, Alaska while on a ship's errand. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion allowing recovery based on "unseaworthiness," because the seaman had not been pro-
vided with "boots adequate for all foreseeable shore duties." Id at 607.
original Harris v. Balk quasi in rem ruling, it would not have taken
the Supreme Court a hundred years to toss out the doctrine. The
rule would never have been born.
If the China and Grigsby rulings have any current justification,
it can only be found in exigent circumstances that sharply differenti-
ate jurisdiction in admiralty from jurisdiction in other areas. The
intrinsic mobility of vessels and the transnational diffusion of the
maritime industry have long been cited as justification for peculiar
admiralty principles, both jurisdictional and substantive. For exam-
ple, regarding matters of venue, admiralty courts have long held a
libel or proceeding in personam was appropriately laid in whatever
district jurisdiction could be found. In the ambulatory business of
maritime lawsuits, venue and jurisdiction in admiralty are coexten-
sive.
In Atkins v. The Disintegrating Co.,83 the court was faced with
foreign attachment under circumstances substantially identical to
Manro v. Almeida.84 The only difference was that the defendants
argued the venue provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789, under
which a "civil suit" could only be brought in the district in which a
defendant resides or is personally found."5 Citing Manro, the court
cast aside the statute, noting that the process of foreign attachment
would be hollow indeed if the cited venue provisions were made ap-
plicable. The term "civil suit," as used in the statute, was thus
deemed not to include quasi in rem proceedings in admiralty.86
In interesting contrast, federal courts have recently held that ad-
miralty in rem proceedings are within the general class of federal
civil proceedings subject to transfer for convenience of the parties.
87
In Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585,88 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the availability of a motion to transfer in an admiralty mat-
ter. Barge FBL-585 sank while being loaded with soybeans. The
vessel owner brought an in personam action in Tennessee against the
cargo owner alleging that the vessel sank because the grain was neg-
ligently loaded. The cargo owner then instituted libel in rem pro-
ceedings against the vessel in Louisiana, charging that the barge
sank because it was unseaworthy. Subsequently, the vessel owner
moved for forum non conveniens transfer of the Louisiana libel to
83. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272 (1873).
84. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
85. The statute provided in part:
And no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts, against an inhabit-
ant of the United States, by any original process in any other district than that
whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the
writ.
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 76.
86. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 301-07.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976).
88. 364 U.S. 19 (1960).
Tennessee, which the cargo owner resisted on the theory that Ten-
nessee was not a district in which the action might have been
brought as required by statute because the vessel, subject of the in
rem jurisdiction, was not susceptible to suit in Tennessee.89 The
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that personification of the vessel,
an "atavistic" remnant from the past, did not prevent the transfer of
venue to Tennessee.9° Furthermore, since the fiction was created to
provide convenient forums, it "should not be transferred into a
weapon to defeat that very purpose."91
The Supreme Court's impatience with vessel personification in
Continental Grain, when that notion was pitted against the need for
efficient and uniform venue transfer in the federal system, does not
bode well for the Court's probable treatment of in rem vessel person-
ification when it is pitted against the constitutionally based contours
of the new jurisdictional demands of Shaffer. Only to the extent that
the vessel is a focus of the rights of the litigants, and that "focus" is
defined in terms of minimum contacts, will jurisdiction in admiralty
remain unaffected by Shaffer.
Therefore, the S.S. Selene approach, couched in terms of the
whole relationship of the litigation to the forum, seems consistent
with the Shaffer decision. It gives limited approval of "attachment
jurisdiction" when attended by an underlying relationship of forum
to controversy that would otherwise constitute constitutionally suffi-
cient contact. 92 The treatment of Rule B in Grand Bahama, how-
ever, seems untenable. Whatever Manro might have stated or
implied about Rule B attachment, the Court in Freights of Mount
Shasta and more recently in Continental Grain appeared unequivo-
cal in its insistence that the federal admiralty courts cannot hide be-
hind the fictions and traditions of in rem libel when important
federal policies are counterpoised against them. Courts should fol-
low this policy not only when general nonmaritime considerations
dictate expansion of venue and jurisdiction, but also when jurisdic-
tion opportunities are contracted as in S.S. Selene.
The SS. Selene approach certainly attempts to reconcile Rule B
with Sha/fer. Unfortunately, the court does great violence to the re-
quirements of Rule B as otherwise interpreted. The assumption
89. Id at 20-21.
90. Id at 27.
91. Id. at 23. The Court also suggested that,
To permit a situation in which two cases involving precisely the same issues are si-
multaneously pending in different District Courts leads to the wastefulness of time,
energy and money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent. Moreover, such a situa-
tion is conducive to a race of diligence among litigants for a trial in the District Court
each prefers. These are additional reasons why § 1404(a) should not be made ambig-
uous by the importation of irrelevant fictions.
Id at 26.
92. See notes 48-54 and accompanying text supra.
under the Rule has always been that it applies as an attachment
device only when the defendant is not otherwise subject to jurisdiction.
Indeed, the rule permits attachment in maritime claims only "if the
defendant shall not be found within the district."9 3 In Chilean Line
Inc. v. United States, 94 the court of appeals interpreted this language
to mean that Rule B attachment is inappropriate unless no other
supportive basis for jurisdiction exists.95 Chilean Line sought a writ
of foreign attachment to garnish approximately $40,000 allegedly
owned by the Government to Main Ship Repair Corporation for
making repairs on two Navy vessels. Main Ship Repair used Chil-
ean Line's pier in Brooklyn, New York and supplies furnished by
Chilean Line to make the repairs. Although Main Ship Repair has
no office or place of business in the Southern District of New York,
it was a New York corporation.96 This fact alone, the court held,
prevented Chilean Line from obtaining in personam jurisdiction
over Main Ship Repair by writ of foreign attachment in admiralty.
The court stated,
Here, this respondent is a New York corporation and as such, in
accordance with concepts of due process, is subject to personal ju-
risdiction in all the federal and state judicial districts within the
territorial limits of the State of New York, which, of course, in-
cludes the Southern District.
We also find, drawing upon federal and New York rules for
service of process in actions at law, that respondent was amenable
to service in the Southern District.97
Since the defendant had contacts with the state, the court considered
the drastic remedy of attachment to be inappropriate.98
Although Chilean Line concerned a domestic corporation and
S S Selene dealt with foreign vessel owners, the two rulings cannot
be persuasively distinguished. First, corporate defendants, whether
foreign or domestic, must have a relationship with the forum that
constitutes "minimum contacts" to save Rule B from Shaffer. If min-
imum contacts exist, however, the defendant is said to be "within"
the district and, therefore, not subject to Rule B at all. Furthermore,
if Chilean Line did not apply to SS, Selene because the defendants
in the latter case were foreign corporations, the result would be the
application of one jurisdictional standard to alien corporations (sub-
ject to Rule B if minimum contacts with forum) and another to do-
mestic corporations (not subject to Rule B if there are minimum
contacts) when the due process considerations for subjection to juris-
93. See text at note 9 supra.
94. 344 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1965).
95. Id at 762.
96. Id at 759.
97. Id at 760.
98. Id at 762.
diction are not and have never been similarly divided.99
The result in Chilean Line portrays the drastically different pos-
tulates underlying Rule B and the generalized notions of minimum
contacts." The Rule is intended as an "emergency" jurisdictional
device that exists apart from independent or cumulative bases of ju-
risdiction when the defendant cannot be found within the district.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, enable summons to
be served through the state in which the district court is held. '0 ' Al-
though the Supreme Court Advisory Committee considered chang-
ing the admiralty rules for attachment and garnishment by
permitting "those remedies only when the defendant cannot be
found within the state," this limitation on those remedies was re-
jected. °2 Thus, even the accommodating S.S. Selene approach can-
not long survive. Requiring a defendant's absence for one purpose
(Rule B attachment) and presence for another (minimum contacts
for jurisdiction) is plainly untenable, if not schizophrenic. Rule B
must be drastically overhauled or abolished.
IV. Amending Rule B
In its present form, Rule B is burdened by constitutional
problems and contradictory results. If the provision requiring ab-
sence from the jurisdiction were deleted and a Shaffer requirement
added, however, the Rule could possibly survive. A suggested
change might read as follows:
(1) When available; complaint, affidavit andprocess.
With respect to any admiralty or maritime claim in which ju-
risdiction over the defendant could otherwise be established by rea-
son of the relationship of the cause of action to the district [or state!
in which the action is proceeding, a verified complaint may contain
a prayer for process to attach assets of the defendant found within
the district. f the cause of action is insufficiently related to the dis-
trict [or state] in which the suit is brought to meet the require-
99. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v.
Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, rehearing denied, 400 U.S. 856 (1970).
100. For a discussion of Chilean Line, see Note, Maritime Attachment Under Rule B: A
Jurisdictional Disguise for an Unconstitutional Securiy Attachment, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 403,
415-19 (1976).
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
102. 28 U.S.C. Supplemental Rule B, Note of Advisory Committee on Rules at 532
(1976).
The effect [of the Rule] is to enlarge the class of cases in which the plaintiff may
proceed by attachment or garnishment although jurisdiction of the person of the de-
fendant may be independently obtained. This is possible at the present time where,
for example, a corporate defendant has appointed an agent within the district to ac-
cept service of process but is not carrying on activities there sufficient to subject it to
jurisdiction . . . or where, though the foreign corporation's activities in the district
are sufficient to subject it personally to the jurisdiction, there is in the district no
officer on whom process can be served. ...
Id (cases omitted). See Seawind Compania, S.A. v. Crescent Line, Inc., 320 F.2d 580 (2d Cir.
1963); United States v. Cia. Naviera Continental, S.A., 178 F. .Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
ments of due process, then the assets proceeded against pursuant to
this Rule must themselves be the subject of the lawsuit or substan-
tively related to the cause of action. When a verified complaint
meets these requirements, the clerk shall forthwith issue a sum-
mons and process of attachment and garnishment. In addition, or
in the alternative, the plaintiff may, pursuant to Rule 4(e), invoke
the remedies provided by state law for attachment and garnish-
ment or similar seizure of the defendant's property. Except for
Rule E(8), these Supplemental Rules do not apply to state reme-
dies so invoked.
This change flatly eliminates the requirement of defendant's ab-
sence from the forum. Formulated in this manner, the Rule fully
incorporates the Shaffer decision: either the assets proceeded against
constitute a "contact" with the state or sufficient contacts exist inde-
pendently.
10 3
The reformulated rule, however, would squarely violate Fuentes
and related cases.'°4 Recall that in Grand Bahama, the court de-
clared Rule B unconstitutional. While the defect was procedural
rather than jurisdictional, under Sniadach and Fuentes, the court de-
termined that the Rule was an impermissible assertion of prejudg-
ment attachment.105 The procedure for Rule B attachment, as
reformulated or in its present form, undoubtedly fails to meet the
procedural demands of Fuentes (mainly, prescribing judicial rather
than clerical issuance of the writ and machinery for prompt, early
contest of the attachment by defendant before litigation on the mer-
its). Rule B, however, has been successfully defended against Fuen-
tes attacks, 10 6 except in Grand Bahama, on the theory that
attachment for the purpose of investing jurisdiction was allowable
under Fuentes. In that decision, the Supreme Court did specify the
necessity of assertion of jurisdiction as an area of permissible pre-
judgment attachment, citing Ownbey v. Morgan, 107 which seemingly
authorized attachment under these circumstances. In Shaffer,
Ownbey was a cornerstone of the state supreme court's defense of
the Delaware statute. The United States Supreme Court, however,
cast grave doubt on the continuing significance of Ownbey when it
did "not read the recent references to Ownbey as necessarily sug-
gesting that Ownbey is consistent with more recent decisions inter-
preting the Due Process Clause."' 0 8
Thus, the continuing vitality of Rule B, if not its very existence,
is beset by contradiction and dilemma. As now formulated, the con-
103. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra.
104. See notes 15-16 supra.
105. See notes 35-45 and accompanying text supra.
106. E.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, rehearing denied,
417 U.S. 977 (1974). In Grand Bahama, the court distinguished the Calero-Toledo decision.
450 F. Supp. at 457.
107. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
108. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 194 n.10 (1977).
dition precedent of lack of jurisdiction and the requirement of un-
derlying jurisdiction insisted upon by S.S. Selene are pathetically
inconsistent. Solving the inconsistency renders the Rule very doubt-
ful, constitutionally, under Fuentes.
Legislative reexamination of Rule B and the general principles
of in rem jurisdiction seem plainly indicated and long overdue. In
an area of law in which the stakes at issue are enormous, all litigants
would obviously benefit by ridding this branch of admiralty of the
fictional libels and attachments presently available. The continuing
vitality of admiralty jurisdiction, and jurisprudence, may very well
demand nothing less.

